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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM CHESS, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 16085 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of an action filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court in a habeas corpus petition in which 
the appellant sought release from custody of the Warden of 
the Utah State Prison by reason of the commitment issued by 
the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County 
in Criminal No. 12095-A. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant's petition came on for hearing on 
Thursday, August 17, 1978, before the Honorable James s. 
Sawaya who heard testimony and reviewed .the trial 
transcript and ordered that the relief sought in the 
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complaint for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks affirmation of the order of 
the Third District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant was tried on December 16 and 1?, 
1976, before a jury in the Second Judicial District Court 
on a charge of Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony. 
The appellant was one of two co-defendants in the case, each 
charged with being an accomplice. The person who admitted 
to robbing the gas station, Ray "Steve" Shearer, was not on 
trial because of a previous plea of guilty to the offense 
(T. 58). 
The evidence, taken in the light most favorable 
to the State, included the fact that on the evening of 
September 27, 1976, shortly before 10:00 p.m., appellant and 
the co-defendant pulled into Star Service Station located 
at 2725 Wall Avenue in Ogden, Utah (T. 10). Appellant was 
driving and the co-defendant was sitting in the passenger's 
side (T. 10). The station was self-service, but the two 
defendants just sat in the car until the attendant, Gregg 
Dunn; went out to see if they needed anything (T. 10). 
Appellant then asked Dunn if he (Dunn) could put a dollar's 
worth of gas in his car for free (T. 10) . Dunn responded 
-2- J 
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that he could not oblige them. Approximately 30 to 45 
seconds later, one of the co-defendants pulled out a 
dollar and said, "Here's a dollar for some gas if you 
will put it in for us." (T. 11). Dunn responded by 
putting the gas in for them. At trial, Dunn testified that 
during this whole process, the two men in the car kept 
making conversation with him and looking nervous (T. 10). 
"They kept looking towards the front door [of the station]." 
(T. 10, 27). 
After Dunn put the gas in, he returned to the 
station house to begin closing up. The defendants did not 
leave, but continued to sit there in the car (a blue Ford 
Galaxie, approximately a 1964 model, T. 10, 43) (T. 11). 
Upon returning inside, Dunn went to the back room where he 
was met by a man with a nylon stocking over his head and a 
gun. (The gun was described by Dunn as looking like a 
long barreled low-caliber .22) (T. 11, 12). This masked 
person was later determined to be Robert Shearer, who 
also went by the name "Steve." (T. 155). At this time, 
the station manager (Mike Martinez) , came in to help close 
up, and Shearer demanded that the money in'the night deposit 
bag be turned over (T. 12, 13). The money was given to 
Shearer, and he left the station; headed reportedly west 
down Doxey Street (T. 13). Evidence adduced at trial shows 
-3-
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that Shearer entered the gas station during the tl'me 
Dunn 
was outside "waiting on" the co-defendants Chess and White 
(T. 60). Further testimony by Mike Martinez revealed 
that 
the defendants had been inside the station on prior 
occasions, knew where the money was kept, and would 1 ikely 
have known that only one employee works and "closes up" 
at night (T. 33). 
Later that same night, a 1964 Galaxie fitting t~ 
description of the suspect vehicle was spotted at 30th and 
Wall (T. 43), at approximately 10:10 P.M. by Officer Coonradt 
of the Ogden City Police Department (T. 42, 43). He sub-
sequently exited his patrol car, looked at the suspect 
vehicle and felt the hood. He testified that the hood was 
warm'!and the engine had therefore been operating very 
recently (T. 43). He then looked around the premises, 
noticed a black male in the upstairs apartment, and motioned 
him to come down (T. 43). Two men came down, at which 
time Officer C:oonradt explained that an armed robbery had 
just occurred, and that the immediate vehicle matched the 
suspect vehicle used in the robbery (T. 44). The two men 
(co-defendants Chess and White) stated that the vehicle 
belonged to them (T. 44). 
Permission was granted to search the vehicle. 
Found under the front seat of the car were three pair of a 
-4-
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woman's nylon stockings (all had been cut off), and a gray, 
plastic gun (T. 44, 48). Becoming more suspicious, Officer 
Coonradt asked permission of White and Chess to search 
their apartment for a white male. Acting very nervous, 
the co-defendants said they did not know a white male and 
had _not seen one (T. 44). Officer Coonradt looked through 
their apartment, and found a holster for a long barreled 
revolver or pistol (T. 44). White and Chess denied any 
knowledge of the holster (T. 44). 
Further investigation by Officer Coonradt leu him 
to the apartment manager, who related that White and Chess 
had a friend named Steve, a white male with blond hair 
(T. 45). Further description of Steve by the manager fit 
the description of the armed robbery suspect (T. 45). The 
officer then asked White and Chess about this man, at which 
time they -admitted that they had a friend named Steve and 
that the holster was his (T. 45). 
OfficerCoonradtasked about a room next to the 
co-defendants'. They said that the room was vacant, locked, 
and never used (T. 45). Attempting to open the door to the 
apartment, Officer Coonradt found it to be chained from the 
inside (T. 45). The door opened a few inches, at which 
time the officer saw what appeared to be a person inawhite 
shirt move across the room, maybe 20 feet away (T. 46) • 
-5-
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(The robbery suspect had been described as wearing a 
light 
colored shirt (T. 30). The officer then pushed the door 
open, went into the room, and noticed a large window on 
the east side of the horne slid completely open (T. 46). 
testified that the window had been closed when he first 
arrived a few minutes earlier (T. 46). 
He 
Following this series of events, Chess and White 
were asked to come to the police station for questioning 
(T. 35). There, White said that a guy named Steve had 
robbed the gas station (T. 37). White described Steve as 
being about 5'11", 27 or 28, having sandy brown hair, a 
mustache, goatee, and parting his hair down the middle 
(T. 37). He further stated that Steve had been planning 
to rob the gas station (T. 38). White also stated Steve 
had a .22 with a brown handle, about four to six inches 
long (T. 38). White stated that the guy next door to their 
apartrnent was a white friend named Steve,
1 
and that Steve 
had told him (Chess) that he was going to rob a place 
that day, and that he had a gun (T. 55). 
Testimony by Ronda Knapp revealed that she not 
only knew Shearer, White, and Chess, but had seen them 
together on several occasions, particularly the night of the 
robbery, September 27, 1976 (T. 70, 71). She stated that 
-6-
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she had seen all three of them together about 7:30 p.m. 
at the Kokomo Lounge (T. 70, 71), and later saw them all 
leave together around 8:30 p.m. or 8:45p.m. (T. 71). She 
further testified that she had a conversation with Shearer, 
Chess, and White in front of the Kokomo Lounge before they 
all left (T. 72). At that time, they were in Chess' car, 
with Chess in the driver's seat, White on the passenger's 
side in the front seat, and Shearer in the back seat (T. 72). 
Shearer asked Ronda if she had any nylons, to which she said 
no. She did, however, ask her friend Pat Wolfe, who in turn 
went inside the Lounge, took her nylons off, came back 
out and gave them to Shearer (T. 72) 1 . Shearer, White, and 
Chess then left, saying that they would be back in an hour 
(R. 73). Ronda saw Shearer later than evening standing in 
front of the lounge, somewhere in the neighborhood of 10:15 
p.m. (T. 72). 
Following the events of September 27, Ronda Knapp 
did not see Shearer again until the following Thursday, 
again at the Kokomo Lounge (T. 73). She stated that his 
appearance was somewhat different, as he had cut his hair 
l Pat Wolfe corroborated this testimony. She stated that 
upon being asked by Ronda for her nylons, she entered the 
lounge, took them off, then gave them to Shearer (T. 98). 
-7-
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and shaved off his goatee (T. 74) . 2 
She asked him why he had 
cut his hair, to which he responded that he and Chess and 
White had robbed a gas station, and " 
in and asked 
. if the cops came 
Steve." (T. 74, 75). He also told her that he had to 
any questions, his name was Raymond and 
not 
jump out of a second story building because the 
cops came 
down to Herbert's (White's) place (T. 75). 
There were several inconsistencies in th t 
e estimony 
of many of the witnesses. The jury, however, apparently 
believing the prosecution's version of the events of 
September 27, 1976, as well as those events leading up to 
and following that night, found appellant guilty. He was 
later sentenced to the Utah State Prison. 
At the hearing held before the Court in the habeas 
corpus proceeding, the appellant testified that he appeared 
in jail clothes at the trial held on December 16 and 17, 
1976, in the Second Judicial District. He stated that he 
requested to appear otherwise, but was told by his counsel 
that it was too late to make any arrangements for other 
clothes. 
Appellant also stated that he did not appeal his 
conviction based upon the fact that he received a letter 
Ronda Knapp described Shearer's appearan~e.the ~ight of 
the robbery, September 27, as follows: H~s ha~r was 
long and he was wearing a goatee and mustache 
"He had on a light shirt. " (T. 74). 
-8-
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from his trial counsel which represented that if he was 
awarded a new trial, he may be found guilty and sentenced 
to a greater prison term than he was presently serving for 
the conviction. A copy of that letter was introduced into 
evidence. 
ARGU!1ENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL 
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH fu~NDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AS THE RESULT 
OF THE REPRESENTATION CONTAINED IN THE 
LETTER OF HIS APPOINTED COUNSEL. 
A. 
THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY 
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL IN COR-
RESPONDENCE TO APPELLANT WERE 
NOT FALSE OR U1PROPER RE-
PRESENTATIONS, AND REPRESENTED 
CORRECT STATEMENTS OF THE LAW 
AS SET FORTH BY THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT. 
Appellant has claimed that but for improper 
representations of appointed counsel as set forth in a 
letter, he (appellant) would have pursued his statutory right 
to appeal. The letter to which appellant refers reads as 
follows: 
June 6, 1977 ... Dear Mr. Chess: 
As I have discussed with you on several 
occasions, it is my opinion that we do 
not have any legal issues substantial enough 
to allow us to win. Furthermore, if we 
were to appeal and win, it would mean a 
new trial. If you were found guilty at a 
new trial, you stand a substantial chance 
of receiving a sentence of 5-life, rather 
than the l-15 you have already been 
sentenced to~ Therefore, I recommend 
that we notify the Supreme Court that you 
do not intend to pursue the appeal. 
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I would. like to hear from you as 
soon ~s possible regarding your desires 
ln thls matter. If you would like to 
appe~l your c<?nviction, I would ap-
preclate lt lf you would outline the 
reasons upon which you would like me 
to bare the appeal. 
The letter was signed by Maurl·ce R' h d · 1 lC ar s, trla counsel 
for appellant. 
Appellant bases his argument, as stated in his 
brief at p. 4, on the fact that "If awarded a new trial, 
the Fourteenth Amendment would have prevented a greater 
punishment than he is presently receiving. 
Respondent submits that in light of the United 
States Supreme Court decisions in North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711 (1969); Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319 (1970); 
and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 u.s. 17 (1973), that 
appellant's allegation that " 
. the Fourteenth Amendment 
would have prevented the trial court from imposing upon 
the appellant a greater punishment than he is presently 
receiving "if a new trial were granted, is totally withe~ 
merit and contrary to existing Federal law. 
In North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, the 
respondent was convicted of a crime and sentenced to a 
prison term. The original conviction was set aside in a 
post-conviction proceeding for constitutional error seven! 
years later. On retrial, the respondent was again convicted 
and sentenced. In one case, the new·sentence, when added 
-10-
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to the time respondent had served, amounted to a longer 
total sentence than that originally imposed; in the other 
case, respondent received a longer sentence, with no credit 
being given for the time already served. In neither case 
was any justification given for imposition of the longer 
sentence. In holding the sentences unconstitutional, the 
supreme Court specifically rejected the notion that the 
Fourteenth Amendment bars a harsher sentence where a 
retrial is granted: 
We hold, therefore, that neither the 
double jeopardy provision nor the Equal 
Protection Clause imposes an absolute 
bar to a more severe sentence upon re-
conviction. A trial judge is not con-
stitutionally precluded, in other words, 
from imposing a new sentence, whether 
greater or less than the original 
sentence, in the light of events sub-
sequent to the first trial that may have 
thrown new light upon the defendant's 
life, health, habits, conduct, and mental 
and moral propensities. William v. New 
York, 337 U.S. 241, 245. 
395 u.s. at 723. 
Speaking specifically in terms of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said: 
. . . whenever a judge imposes a 
more severe sentence upon a defendant 
after a new trial, the reasons for 
his doing so must affirmatively appear. 
Id. at 726. 
The court went on to state criteria upon which those reasons 
must be based. 
-11-
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In Moon v. Maryland, supra, a defendant was found 
guilty of armed robbery and sentenced by the judge to 12 
years inprisonrnent. On appeal, his conviction was set 
aside. At a second trial for the same offense, the defe d 
n an: 
was again convicted, but the trial judge imposed a sent 
ence 
of 20 years imprisonment, less credit for time served under 
the original sentence. The second conviction was affirmed 
on appeal, and the United States Supreme Court dismissed 
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The Court, 
in declaring that the guidelines in Pearce had been met in 
the imposition of the harsher sentence on retrial, stated 
that reasons for the harsher sentence include "objective 
information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of 
the defendant occurring after the time of the original 
sentencing proceeding." 398 u.s. at 321. 
In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, the United 
States Supreme Court addressed the situation where a jury, 
functioning in-the sentencing process, imposed a harsher 
sentence on retrial and conviction than had the jury on the 
original conviction and sentence. In Chaffin, the defenda~ 
was convicted of a felony and sentenced by the jury to 15 
years in prison. On a habeas petition, a retrial was 
ordered because of the giving of an improper alibi instrocti~, 
Upon retrial before a different judge and jury in the state 
court (Georgia) , the defendant was reconvicted and sentenced 
-12- l 
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by the new jury to life imprisonment. The new jury was 
aware of the previous trial, but unaware of the previous 
S entence imposed therein. In aff' · h ~rm~ng t e second conviction 
and sentence, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through 
Justice Powell, held that: 
The rendition of a higher 
sentence by a jury upon retrial does 
not violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. Nor does such a sentence 
offend the Due Process Clause so long 
as the jury is not informed of the 
prison sentence and the second 
sentence is not otherwise shown to 
be a product of vindictiveness. The 
choice occasioned by the possibility 
of a harsher sentence, even in the 
case in which the choice may in 
fact be "difficult," does not place 
an impermissible burden on the right 
of a criminal defendant to appeal or 
attack collaterally his conviction. 
412 U.S. at 35. 
Thus, the law is well settled that the Constitution 
does not prohibit the giving of a harsher sentence upon 
retrial and reconviction. If, on the new trial, the sentence 
the defendant receives from the court is greater than that 
imposed after the first trial, it must be explained by 
reasons "based upon objective information concerning 
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring 
after the time of the original sentencing proceeding," other 
than his having pursued the appeal or collateral remedy. 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 u.s. at 726. On the other 
-13-
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hand, if the sentence is imposed by the jury and not by 
the court, if the jury is not aware of the original 
sentence, and if the second sentence is not otherwise 
shown to be a product of vindictiveness, a harsher sentence 
will stand. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 u.s. at 17. 
Thus, appellant's contention that the Fourteenth 
Amendment precludes the trial court from imposing a greater 
punishment than he is presently receiving upon retrial and 
reconviction is unfounded. Therefore, the advice given ~ 
him by his counsel that upon retrial, a harsher sentence 
could be imposed, was correct in a legal sense, and not a 
misrepresentation of the law. 
B. 
THE CORRESPONDENCE TO APPELLANT 
FROM HIS COUNSEL AND THE RE-
PRESENTATIONS MADE THEREIN 
FURNISHED A SOUND BASIS ON WHICH 
APPELLANT COULD BASE A DECISION 
WHETHER OR NOT TO EXERCISE HIS 
STATUTORY RIGHT TO APPEAL .. 
Appellant has alleged that because of the 
representation of his appointed counsel, he was denied his 
right to appeal and therefore he is being unjustly and 
unlawfully restrained of his liberty. He cites a few 
cases, which, as he says, support his theory that a 
defendant be freed of the apprehension of receiving 
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a harsher sentence after the retrial of his case and that the 
oue Process Clause forbids harsher sentences after re-trial." 
Appellant's Brief, p. 3. Respondent has already shown 
that appellant's theory is not the law. (See Point I-A, 
supra). 
Appellant seemingly says that because his counsel 
made him aware of the realities of a possible harsher 
sentence if a new trial was granted and another conviction 
occurred, -he waived his right of appeal. Such argument 
is without merit, as appellant's right to appeal was not 
"chilled." The decision to be made by appellant whether 
or not to appeal may have been difficult, but the Constitution 
does not forbid or preclude such a decision making process. 
As the United States Supreme Court said in Chaffin v. 
stynchcombe, 412 u.s. at 32: 
The criminal process, like the 
rest of the legal system, is replete 
with situations requiring "the making 
of difficult judgments" as to-which 
come to follow ... Although a 
defendant may have a right, even of 
constitutional dimensions, to follow 
whichever course he chooses, the 
Constitution does not by that token 
always forbid_requiring him to choose. 
Cite omitted. 
The Court, in equating some of the harsh incidental 
consequences of exercising the right to remain silent with 
exercising a right to appeal, thereby risking a greater or 
harsher sentence upon reconviction stated: 
-15-
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. . . Just as in the guilty plea 
case~ an~ Crampton [forgery right to 
:emaln.sllent on the issue of guilt 
ln a Slngle trial as opposed to 
bifurcated trial] , an incidental 
consequence of that practice is that 
it may require the accused to choose 
whether to accept the risk of a higher 
sentence or to waive his rights. We 
see nothing in the right to appeal or 
the right to attack collaterally a 
conviction, even where constitutional 
errors are claimed, which elevates 
those rights above the rights to jury 
trial and to remain silent. 
Petitioner w~s not himself 
"chilled" in the exercise of his right 
to appeal by the possibility of a 
higher sentence on retrial and we 
doubt that the "chill factor" will 
after be a deterrent of any significance. 
412 u.s. at 32, 33. 
. .. 
Appellant's decision to sign a motion dismissing 
his appeal was based on competent advice from his attorney. 
The record reveals that on June 6, 1977, appellant's attorne
1 
sent him a letter (see Point I-A, supra) stating his opinion 
that there was no legal issue that would support a reversal. 
The attorney also pointed out that a victory in the Supreme 
Court would simply result in a new trial, with the 
possibility that the sentence therein would be more severe 
than that which the appellant was already serving. The 
attorney then asked appellant to express his desire as W 
whether or not the appeal should be made. On June 15, 1977, 
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the attorney spoke with appellant regarding the appeal, 
and on that same date sent to appellant a Motion to Dismiss, 
which appellant signed. That letter also discussed the 
attorney's continued involvement in the affairs of the 
petitioner in regard to another sentence he was serving at 
the time. This chain of correspondence indicates that the 
attorney was acting in appellant's interest by advising 
him of the options available to him and by offering to 
pursue the appeal if the appellant so desired. The cor-
respondence also implies that appellant acquiesed in the 
Motion to Dismiss, as is evidenced by his signature on the 
letter. In summary, appellant made an informed decision 
not to appeal his conviction. 
Appellant's decision not to appeal does not fall 
into the category of, nor is it controlled by Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In Anders, the United 
states Supreme Court held that where the convicted party 
wanted to pursue a first appeal, but his attorney did not 
feel that there was grounds to support an appeal and 
desired to withdraw, that the attorney had a duty to prepare 
a brief discussing all potential sources of appeal and submit 
it along with a letter requesting withdrawal from the case and 
appointment of new counsel. In the case at bar, there is no 
indication that the appellant desired to pursue an appeal. 
-17-
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Furthermore, the letter of June 6 1977 · d 
, , ln ica tes that the 
attorney would have pursued the appeal at appellant's 
regueo-
State decisions falling within the ambit of the 
present factual situation sustain res o d t' P n en s assertions. 
In Duran v. Turner, 30 Utah 2d 249, 516 P.2d 353 (1973), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that where a prisoner failed ~ 
request his attorney or anyone else to file an appeal on his 
behalf, especially where ~e (prisoner) had been familiar 
with the appeals process, there was no showing that the 
attorney was incompetent because of his failure to file q 
appeal. 
In Maimona v. State, 82 N.M. 281, 480 P.2d 171 
(1971), a defendant claimed that his attorney did not perfec: 
an appeal even though he had requested him to do so. The 
attorney had written to the defendant and advised him of 
his right to appeal, but stated that he was no longer his 
attorney. The record in that case, as in the case at bar, 
did not establish that the defendant had requested his 
court-appointed attorney to appeal. The court in Maimona 
denied the defendant's request to appeal the order convictin: 
him, and stated further, at page 17 4, that refusal to appeal, 
standing alon~ could not indicate inadequacy of representaL: 
The Iowa Supreme Court in Blanchard v. Bennett, 
167 N.W. 2d 612 (1969), was confronted with a case in whi~ 
an attorney had failed to follow the statutory procedures 
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for appeal, causing the defendant to lose his right to 
appeal. In a petition for habeas corpus, the petitioner 
alleged incompetency of counsel for failure to perfect the 
appeal. At page 615, the court concluded: 
From a careful review of the 
cases which have considered the 
problem, two general principles emerge: 
(l) failure to appeal is not generally 
excused by a mere showing of neglect 
of counsel and (2) in any event to 
become entitled to relief by way of 
collateral attack on such a claim 
petitioner must allege and demonstrate 
prejudicial error in the trial pro-
ceedings. 
(emphasis add~d). 
In conclusion then, respondent submits that 
appellant has not shown any error in the trial proceedings 
that warrants reversal. Nor has he demonstrated that he 
requested that an appeal be pursued. The advice received 
from his counsel was sound, competent, and legally correct 
in substance. Appellant made his decision thereon and 
should have to live with his exercise of judgment. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL 
NOR HIS DUE PROCESS OF LAI~ BECAUSE HE 
APPEARED BEFORE THE JURY IN IDENTIFIABLE 
PRISON CLOTHES. 
Appellant contends that his appearance in jail 
clothes before the jury denied him his due process of law 
and a fair trial. He claims to have made a request to 
his appointed counsel not to appear in jail clothing. 
Assuming that appellant's allegations that he 
was tried in prison clothing and that he informed his 
counsel that he desired otherwise are true, he would 
still not be entitled to relief under the controlling 
cases of Estelle v. Williams, 96 S.Ct. 1691, reh. denied 
96 S.Ct. 3182 (1976); State v. Archuletta, 28 Utah 2d 255, 
501 P.2d 263 (1972); and State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 501 
P. 2d 107 (1972). 
In Estelle v. Williams, ~, a Texas defendant 
was tried for a crime of assault with intent to commit 
murder. Unable to post bond, the defendant remained in 
custody awaiting trial. When he learned that he was going 
to trial, the defendant asked an officer at the jail for 
his civilian clothes. This request was denied, and the 
defendant was tried in distinctly marked prison clothes. 
No objection to the clothing was raised at trial, and the 
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defendant was convicted and sentenced to the State Pr
1
· 
son 
The defendant then sought release by means of a federal 
writ of habeas corpus. The United States Supreme Court 
held: 
••• the failure to make an objection 
to the court as to being tried in such ~lathes 
[prison clothes], for whatever reason, ~s 
sufficient to negate the Presence of compul-
sion necessary to establish a constitutional 
violation. 
96 S.Ct. at 1697 (emphasis added). 
The Court, in discussing the requirement that 
an accused object to the court to being tried in prison 
garments, said that a defendant must invoke or abandon the 
right not to be tried in jail clothes, just as he would 
invoke or abandon any other right: 
"We held [in Hernandez] that the 
defendant and his attorney had the burden 
to make known that the defendant desired to 
be tried in civilian clothes before the 
state could be accountable for his being 
tried in jail clothes •••• " 
96 s.ct. at 1695. 
In State v. Archuletta, supra, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
• • • Even if [the defendant were tried 
in jail clothes], it does not strike u~ that 
there would be anything strange, shock~ng or 
prejudicial if the jury became aware th~t a 
man who had been arrested and charged ~~th . 
robberv was in custody and being held ~n Jall. 
501 P.2d at 264. 
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In State v. Fair, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
reached the conclusion that where no objection was made 
at trial to the defendant's presence in prison clothes, 
there was no error. 
The facts of the instant case show no error was 
committed. Neither appellant nor his counsel objected to 
the court concerning his desire not to be tried in jail 
clothes. Furthremore, evidence at trial clearly revealed 
to members of the jury that appellant was being detained in 
custody for some time prior to trial (T.l04,105). Thus, 
even without the presence of the jail clothes, the jury would 
have known of appellant's confinement prior to trial. As 
the United States Supreme Court said in Estelle v. Williams, 
supra, "'No prejudice can result from seeing that which is 
already known.'" Id. at 1694. 
Respondent therefore urges that no error was com-
mitted and no prejudice resulted from the appearance of 
appellant in his prison clothes at trial. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
NOR PREJUDICE FROM CONFLICT OF INTEREST AS 
A RESULT OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE 
APPELLANT AND A WITNESS FOR THE STATE BY 
APPELLANT 1 S COUNSEL IVHERE THE WITNESS 1 
CASE HAD ALREADY BEEN DISPOSED OF PRIOR 
TO THE TRIAL AT WHICH APPELLANT WAS 
REPRESENTED BY THE SM1E COUNSEL. 
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Appellant alleges in his brief that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel because his 
at tor no 
was also the attorney for Ray "Steve" Shearer, one of the 
prosecution's witnesses. As authority, he cites cases 
which deal with the representation of r:1ultiple defendants 
by the same attorney, under varying circUMstances. 
The case at bar however is distinguishable froo 
the cases and arguments cited by appellant in that in ~e 
present case appellant's attorney was representing only 
one defendant during the trial. Shearer, one of the 
prosecution witnesses, who was also called by the defense, 
had been represented by appellant's attorney when he 
(Shearer) had pled guilty to the robbery. That case, howe.,., 
had been disposed of prior to appellant's trial. 
Nevertheless, case law, which appears to be the 
majority rule, holds that while the dual representation of 
a prosecution witness and a defendant places the attorney 
in a conflict of interest, the defendant must demonstrate 
that the attorney did something or failed to do somthing 
which he otherwise would have, and which resulted in actua: 
prejudice to the defendant. Goodson v. Pevton, 351 F.2d 90: 
(CA 4, 1965); Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461 (CA 5, 
1962); Bresnahan v. People, 487 P.2d 551 (Colo. 1971); and 
Ciarelli v. State, 441 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1969). 
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In a recent case, United States ex rel. Means 
v. Solem, 452 F.Supp. 1256 (D.c.s.o. 1978), the trial court 
refused to permit withdrawal of petitioner's counsel because 
of a prior attorney-client relationship between petitioner's 
counsel and one of the prosecution's witnesses. Petitioner 
alleged that his constitutional rights to effective assistance 
of counsel were violated by the trial court's action. His 
allegations were refuted by the court. In denying petitioner's 
claim, the Federal court cited certain factors to be considered 
relative to a possible conflict of interest: (1) a lawyer's 
pecuniary interest in future business with the client; (2) 
the possibility that privileged information obtained from the 
witness might be relevant to cross-examination. United States 
v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 u.s. 
1066, 96 s.ct. 805, 46 L.Ed.2d 656 (1975). A third considera-
tion or factor cited by the Solem court to be considered in 
possible conflict cases is whether the trial transcript 
reveals that the defendant's attorney conducted a vigorous 
cross-examination. See Olshen·v. McMann, 378 F.2d 993 (2d 
cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 u.s. 874, 88 s.ct. 165, 19 L.Ed.2d 
157 (1967); Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 
1968). 
Turning to the specifics of the case at bar and 
applying the factors set forth by the Jeffers and Solem courts, 
-24-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it becomes apparent that petitioner h f 'l d 
as a l e to show arc· 
particular preJ'udice which may have r· b 
a lsen ecause of the 
alleged conflict. Regarding th f' t f t 
e lrs ac or, respondent 
submits that appellant's attorney was not in a position 
to affect a pecuniary interest by his conduct since he ~s 
the appointed counsel for Shearer, and had no reasonable 
expectation of a continuing relationship. 
Referring to the second factors, the use of 
privileged information and cross examination, the Jeffers 
----.::. 
court said: 
We think the courts can generally 
rely on the sound discretion of members 
of the bar to treat privileged information 
with appropriate respect. Moreover •.• 
it is the witness, rather than the defendant, 
who should object to the cross-examination 
by his former attorney. 
520 F.2d at 1265. 
In the case at bar, appellant's attorney advised 
the witness, Shearer, not to incriminate himself in any 
other matter. Thus, appellant's attorney was left free to 
conduct his examination on matters pertinent to the case 
at bar and pertinent to the defense of appellant. 
The third factor to be considered is the vigor 
with which the witness is examined. The record (transcrip: 
reveals that appellant's counsel conducted a vigorous 
examination of Shearer concerning the events of SeptembM 
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27, 1976, as well as all events leading up to the night 
of the robbery and all events subsequent thereto (T.l42-
146). In this respect, it is noteworthy that Shearer's 
testimony to the effect that he acted alone in the commis-
sion of the crime was actually exculpatory for the appellant 
(T.62). The transcript shows that Shearer, having pled 
guilty to the robbery charge, was called as a prosecution 
witness as well as a defense witness. The record also 
clearly shows that appellant's attorney was concerned only 
that Shearer might incriminate himself in another matter 
(T.SB). Thus, the "door was wide open" for examination 
and cross-examination of Shearer by appellant's attorney 
regarding the robbery itself and matters incidental 
thereto. The record reveals that no potential conflicting 
situations arose. 
A final factor considered important by the 
courts in discussing conflict of interest is the defendant's 
awareness of the potential conflict. Bresnahan, supra; 
state v. Johnson, 549 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1977). There is 
nothing contained in the record to show that the appellant 
was actually aware of the potential conflict, but it is 
significant that the appellant, his co-defendant, and 
Shearer were housed in the same cell in the Weber County Jail 
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for some time prior to the trial (T.l89). It is 
unreasonable to assume that the appellant was not 
aware that his attorney also had represented Shearer, 
and that Shearer would be called as a witness. At no 
time prior to, or during the course of the trial, did 
the appellant object to this potential conflict. 
Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel due to potential conflict of interest is 
unsubstantiated by the record in this case. Appellant 
has the burden to persuade the court that his counsel 
failed in some manner to represent his interests, 
resulting in prejudice to his defense. State v. Forsyth, 
560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977). There is no evidence that 
appellant's attorney failed to do something he should 
have done or that he was in any way hampered in his 
defense of appellant. 
The standard for effective assistance of couns~ 
in Utah was clearly stated in Andreason v. Turner, 27 Ut~ 
2d 182, 493 P.2d 1278 (1972): 
The accused is entitled to the assistance 
of a competent member of the Bar, who shows a 
willingness to identify with the interests of 
the defendant and present such defenses that 
are available to him under the law and . 
consistent with the ethics of the profess~on. 
493 P.2d at 279. 
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The appellant has the burden of proving that the 
representation he received was only a sham or pretense. 
Andreason, supra. The record in the case at bar will 
not support such a burden. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
AND THE ERRORS COMPLAINED OF BY 
APPELLANT WERE IN FACT NOT ERRORS 
IN ANY LEGAL CONNOTATION. 
Appellant has listed several alleged points 
of error in Point IV of his brief, which, he says, when 
cumulatively viewed, call for reversal. Examination 
of these allegations reveals no support for such a claim. 
First, appellant claims that the evidence does 
not support the verdict. The record of course must be 
reviewed in the light favorable to the judgment and under 
the assumption that the trier of fact believed the evidence 
which supports the verdict. State v. Mecham, 23 Utah 2d 18, 
456 P.2d 156 (1969); State v. King, 564 P.2d 767 (Utah 1977). 
When this is done, the evidence presented clearly supports 
the verdict of the jury. 
There is no dispute over the fact that the 
appellant and the co-defendant were present at the gas 
station immediately prior to the robbery (T.lO). After 
receiving a dollar's worth of gas, they remained at the 
station in the car, instead of driving off as most customers 
-28-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
do following completion of their purchase (T.l0,11).3 
Upon re-entering the station, the attendant, Greg Dunn 
, 
was robbed by a white male wearing a light shirt (T.30), 
later determined to be Ray "Steve" Shearer (T.ll-13). 
Later that night, appellant and his co-defen~~ 
were confronted at the co-defendar.t 's apartment. There, 
the car which they had been driving was searched. In 
i~ were found women's nylon stockings which had been 
cut off, very similar to the type stocking used as a 
mask by Shearer in the robbery earlier that night (T.44,4e 
A subsequent investigation of the co-defendant's apartment 
rendered a holster made for a long barrelled revolver or 
4 pistol (T.44). The investigating officer then inqu~~ 
of the apartment manager if the appellant and co-defendant 
had a white male friend. The apartment manager responded 
that they indeed had a friend named "Steve," with blond 
hair, who was a white male. Further description of this 
man by the apartment manager fit the description of 
the armed robbery suspect (T.45). 
3 
4 
Greg Dunn testified that the appellant and his companic 
acted "very nervous," and kept looking. toward the fron: 
of the station during this period of tlme (T.l0,27), 
The gun used in the robbery was described as being a 
long barrelled low caliber .22 (T.ll,l2). 
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Following this encounter, evidence reveals 
that the officer went back upstairs to a room located 
next to co-defendant White's room. Upon trying to 
enter,the officer found the door chained from the inside 
(T.45). He opened the door a few inches and saw what 
appeared to be a person in a white shirt moving across 
the room (T.46). The door was then pushed open, at 
which time the officer noticed a large window, which 
minutes before was closed, now open (T.46). 
Appellant and his co-defendant were then asked 
to come to the police station, where the co-defendant 
White said that guy named "Steve" robbed the gas station. 
He gave a description of this person, and related that he 
(Steve) had been planning to rob the gas station (T.35-38). 
White stated that Steve had a .22 caliber, about 4 to 6 
inches long (T.38). The appellant stated that the guy in 
the room next to his apartment was a white friend named 
Steve, who had a gun, and who had told him (appellant) 
that he was going to rob a place that day (T.SS). 
Testimony by Ronda Knapp revealed that she had 
seen Shearer, White and the appellant together prior to 
the time of the robbery the same night of the robbery 
(T.70,71). They were at the Kokomo Lounge. She stated 
that she saw them all leave the lounge together at 
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approximately 8:45p.m., which was about an hour and 
fifteen minutes prior to the robbery (T.71). She also 
revealed that she had a conversation with Shearer, White 
I 
and appellant before they left, at which time Shearer 
asked her for a pair of nylons (T.72). The nylons were 
supplied by Pat Wolfe, a friend of Ronda Knapp's (T.72, 
98). This occurred while the appellant, Shearer, and 
White were sitting in appellant's car, the same car which 
was described as being used in the robbery (T.72,43-44), 
Several days later, Ronda Knapp saw Shearer agai;., 
at which time she noticed that he had cut his hair and 
shaved his goatee (T.74). Upon inquiring as to why he 
had cut his hair, Shearer responded that he, appellant, 
and White had robbed a gas station, and " ••• if the cops 
came in and asked • • • any questions his name was Raymond 
and not Steve." (T.74,75). He also related that he had 
jumped out of a second story building because the cops 
came down to Herbert's (White's) place (T.75). 
There were inconsistencies in the testimony, 
but apparently the jury in exercising their function, 
chose to believe that version of the testimony which 
supported the prosecution's theory. As such, this Court 
should not now disturb the verdict as being unsupported 
by the evidence. 
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Second, appellant complains that the trial 
court erred in allowing the statements made by him 
after the robbery into evidence without any showing 
of the Miranda warning (T.35). Respondent submits 
that the statements made by appellant to the police 
prior to his arrest were properly admitted at trial. 
The appellant was identified by the victim 
of the robbery as having been at the station at or near 
the time the principal, Shearer, entered the station. 
Within minutes after the crime, the police located the 
car that appellant had been driving at the gas station. 
The police also located the appellant (T.43). Because 
the appellant and his companion, the co-defendant at 
trial, seemed to know a great deal about the robbery, 
they were brought down to the police station and inter-
viewed (T.35). At that time appellant and the co-defendant 
made separate statements. The transcript indicates that 
they were interviewed separately (T.46). 
In State v. Hasato Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 602, 
126 P.2d 1047, 1052 (1942), the Utah Supreme Court defined 
admission and confession: 
A confession is an admission of guilt 
by the defendant of all the necessary.eleme~ts 
of the crime of which he is charged, ~nclud~ng 
the necessary acts and intent. An admission 
merely admits some fact which connects or tends 
to connect the defendant with the offense but 
not with all the elements of the crime. 
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Only the most strained reading of appellant's 
statement could construe it as a confession. The 
statement made by appellant indicates only that he was 
at the station at about the time it was robbed. The 
balance is directed toward his knowledge of a third 
party named Steve Hadley. There was no discussion at 
the trial as to whether the statement was an admission 
or confession, and in fact, it was appellant's attorney 
who offered the statement into evidence (T.l63) because 
of his belief that the statements were exculpatory 
(T.238). At no time during the trial did appellant obj~t 
to the admission into evidence of the statements. 
The statement that appellant now complains of 
was voluntarily giveno Assuming, arguendo, that it was 
not voluntarily given, it must be treated as an admissioo 
under the definition in Karumai. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated in Karumai at 126 P.2d 1052: 
The great weight of authority 
and the better reasoned cases hold that 
before receiving an admission--as dis-
tinguished from a confession--i~ ~vidence, 
it is not necessary that a prel1m1nary 
showing be made to the effect that the 
statement was voluntary. 
This holding was followed in State v. Hymas, 102 Utah 371, 
131 P.2d 791, 793 (1942). Therefore, since the statement 
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was at least an admission, it is admissible without regard 
to whether it was voluntarily given. 
Appellant asserts that his statement was made 
without him being advised of his Miranda rights. See 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965}. In that case, 
the Court directed its remarks to statements obtained 
through interrogation. At 384 u.s. 484, the Court said: 
In dealing with statements obtained 
through interrogation, we do not purport 
to find all confessions inadmissible. 
Confessions remain a proper element in 
law enforcement. Any statement given 
freely and voluntarily without any 
compelling influences is, of course, 
admissible in evidence. The fundamental 
import of the privilege while an 
individual is in custody is not whether 
he is allowed to talk to the police without 
the benefit of warnings and counsel, but 
whether he can be interrogated. There is 
no requirement that police stop a person 
who enters a police station and states 
that he wishes to confess to a crime, 
or a person who calls the police to offer 
a confession or any other statement he 
desires to make. Volunteered statements 
of any kind are not barred by the Fifth 
Amendment and their admissibility is 
not affected by our holding today. 
Since Miranda, the Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 u.s. 
478 (1964} "focus of the investigation" test has been 
replaced by the "in custody interrogation" test. State v. 
Bainch, 109 Ariz. 77, 505 P.2d 248 (1973}. 
In the case at bar, appellant was asked to accompany 
the police officers to the police station. Officer Coonradt 
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testified that at the time he considered the appellant to 
be a suspect (T.46), but the suspect was not under arrest 
at the time; nor was there any evidence that he objected 
to going to the police station. The fact that the appellaM 
was not under arrest at the time is not dispositive of 
the issue, United States v. Pearce, 397 F.2d 128 (CA 4, l96s 
however, it does reflect on the total situation and the 
appellant's reasonable belief that he was or was not "in 
custody." After the appellant was interviewed, he was free 
to go, and he did so. There is no evidence that he was "in 
custody" at the time the statement was voluntarily given. 
The United States Supreme Court, in a recent 
decision Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 u.s. 492 (1977), discussed 
Miranda and the "in custody" doctrine. In Mathiason, supra, 
the defendant was asked to come down to the state patrol 
office, which he voluntarily did. The officer advised 
Mathiason that he was a suspect in a burglary but that he 
was not under arrest, and then falsely stated that Mathiason': 
fingerprints had been found at the scene of the burglary. Th: 
defendant,without being advised of his rights, admitted the 
burlgary. The officer was allowed to testify as to this 
statement at trial. After the admission, the officer advis~ 
the defendant of his rights and took a taped conversation. 
The Oregon Supreme Court held (549 P.2d 673), that the 
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interrogation took place in a coercive environment and 
that the testimony relating to the conversation prior to 
the giving of the Miranda warning was not admissible. 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision and discussed 
the "custodial interrogation" theory at 429 u.s. 495: 
In the present case, however, there 
is no indication that the questioning took 
place in a context where respondent's 
freedom to deport was restricted in any 
way. He came voluntarily to the police 
station, where he was immediately informed 
that he was not under arrest. At the 
close of a l/2-hour interview respondent 
did in fact leave the police station. 
Without hindrance, it is clear from these 
facts that Mathiason was not in custody 
"or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
action in ·any significant way." 
Any interview of one suspected of a 
crime by a police officer will have coercive 
aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact 
that the police officer is part of a law 
enforcement system which may ultimately 
cause the suspect to be charged with a 
crime. But police officers are not 
required to administer Miranda warnings 
to everyone whom they question. Nor is 
the requirement of warnings to be imposed 
simply because the questioning takes 
place in the station house, or because 
the questioned person is one whom the police 
suspect. 
In summary, the Supreme Court held in Mathiason 
that police station interrogations of a defendant are not 
inherently coercive, thus requiring Miranda warnings. 
Numerous state court decisions have discussed 
the "in custody" theory. In the California case of 
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People v. Morse, 452 P.2d 607 (1969), at 613, the court 
stated: 
We have also made it clear on a number 
of occasions that any determination as to 
whether or not a process of interrogations 
was undertaken must rest upon an objective 
test according to which we "analyze the total 
situation which envelopes the questioning by 
considering such factors as the length of 
the interrogation, the nature of the questions, 
the conduct of the police and all other relevant 
circumstances." (People v. Stewart (1965) 62 
Cal.2d 571, 579, 43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 206, 400 
P.2d 97, 102, affd. sub. non. California v. 
Stewart (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
16 L.Ed.2d 694.) 
The Arizona Supreme Court stated its test for 
custodial interrogation in State v. Halton, 116 Ariz. 142, 
568 P.2d 1040 (1977), as being "would a reasonable man feel 
that he was deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." 
In summary, there are several factors which 
indicate that a Miranda warning was not necessary under the 
circumstances: (l) even though the appellant was a suspect 
he was not "in custody" at the time he voluntarily made the 
statement, (2) the appellant went to the station house 
voluntarily, and was allowed to leave after answering 
questions, and (3) the statement was not obtained in a 
coercive manner. 
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At the trial, no objection was made to the 
introduction of the statement, or to the testimony of 
the officer who took the statement. Apparently the 
appellant himself did not view the statement to have 
been taken in violation of his constitutional rights 
because he did not object to its adMission, nor does 
it appear that he viewed it as grounds for appeal at 
the time he was asked by his attorney, Mr. Richards, to 
identify potential issues for appeal. 
Even if, arguendo, the statement was improperly 
admitted into evidence, Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
is dispositive of the issue: 
RULE 4 EFFECT OF ERRONEOUS ADMISSION 
OF EVIDENCE. A verdict or finding shall 
not be set aside, nor shall judgment or 
decision based thereon be reversed, by 
reason of the erroneous admission of evidence 
unless (a) there appears of record objection 
to the evidence timely interposed and so 
stated as to make clear the specific ground 
of objection, and (b) the court which passes 
upon the effect of the error or errors is of 
the opinion that the admitted evidence should 
have been excluded on the ground stated 
and probably had a substantial influence in 
bringing about the verdict or finding. How-
ever, the court in its discretion and in the 
interests of justice, may review the erroneous 
admission of evidence even though the grounds 
of the objection thereto are not correctly 
stated. 
There was no objection at trial to the evidence, 
and in view of the emphasis given the statement by the 
defense attorney as being exculpatory, it cannot be argued 
-38-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institu e of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the statement had any substantial influence in 
bringing about the guilty verdict. Appellant's complaint 
that the trial court erred in admitting his statement is 
therefore not well founded, 
Appellant's third complaint alleges that the 
prosecutor asked a series of four leading questions 
"designed to elicit conclusions which the witness did 
not have the ability to draw from his personal observa-
tions." Appellant's brief, p. 9. The colloquy went as 
follows: 
(T.33). 
(Prosecutor) Q. Mike, inasmuch as 
the defendants are familiar with the 
station, do you know if they have ever 
been inside the station? 
(Witness) A. Yes, they have. 
(Prosecutor) Q. Would they know 
where the back room is? 
(Witness) A. Sure. 
(Prosecutor) Q •. I assume they 
would know where the money was kept? 
(Witness) A. Yes, I imagine 
they would. 
(Prosecutor) Q. Would they likely 
know that only one employee works at 
night and closes up? 
(Witness) A. Yes. 
Appellant alleges that the foregoing line of questioning 
violated Rules 19 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
There is no foundation in appellant's claim. 
Examination of the record reveals that the questions were 
directed towards Mike Martinez on redirect examination. 
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Martinez was the station manager of the station robbed. 
He testified on direct examination that he knew appellant 
and his companion, co-defendant White (T.29). He also 
testified that they (appellant and co-defendant) had come 
into the station to get gas, cigarettes, coke, etc., on 
many occasions (T.29). On cross-examination by appellant's 
attorney, Martinez was asked if the co-defendants were 
good customers, thereby implying that they frequented the 
station on more than one occasion (T.3l). He replied 
that "They came in all the time, yes, sir." (T.3l). Thus, 
the questions asked on redirect examination were not leading 
at all, but in further search of the area opened up by 
appellant's counsel on cross-examination. The area of 
questioning had also been explored on direct examination, 
thereby establishing a foundation (T.29). 
Appellant's argument that the questions are a 
violation of Rules 19 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
is without merit. Rule 19 deals with prerequisites of 
knowledge and experience of witnesses as establishing a basis 
for testimony on relevant or material matters. The 
applicable portion to this case reads: 
As a prerequisite for the testimony 
of a witness on a relevant or material 
matter, there must be evidence that he 
has personal knowledge thereof •••• 
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Rule 56, as applicable to this case, reacts in part: 
(1) If the witness is not testifying 
as an expert his testimony in the form of 
opinion or inferences is limited to such 
opinions or inferences as the judge finds 
(a) may be rationally based on the perception 
of the witness and (b) are helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony or to the 
determination of the fact in issue .••• 
Clearly, the questions asked and the answers given were 
based upon the personal observation; personal knowledge 
and perception of the witness, Mike Martinez (T.29-33), 
thus precluding a violation of the rules. 
Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, that the 
questions should not have been permitted, these admissions 
would have been harmless error under Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, since they would not ". probably had 
a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict ... " I 
In addition, appellant's counsel made no objection to the 
testimony at the time, thus himself not complying with Rule 
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Appellant's argument 
is therefore without merit. 
Appellant's fourth allegation of error concerns 
the search of the apartment. He states in his brief at 
pages 9 and 10 that "There also exists a substantial 
question as to whether the search of the appellant's 
premises was constitutional error •• Respondent 
intially would point out that the premises searched did not 
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belong to appellant. Only co-defendant White lived on 
the premises searched (T.l76). Secondly, nothing was 
found on the premises of an incriminating nature, with the 
possible exception of the holster. Even excluding the 
admission of the holster, the verdict would not be affected, 
nor would there be any likelihood thereof. Finally, 
appellant has never challenged the search up until this 
point in time (it is still highly questionable whether he 
is presently doing so), and has no standing to challenge 
the search, since he did not reside there. 
Appellant's final point of contention alleges 
that the testimony of the Weber County jailer that appellant 
and co-defendant were inmates at the jail and were housed in 
the same area as the witness, Steve Shearer, was unduly 
prejudicial and was not relevant to any issue in the trial. 
It is obvious that the reason for calling the jailer to the 
stand was to make it known that the codefendants and the 
admitted robber, Shearer, being housed in the same area of 
the jail, had ample opportunity to converse with each other 
prior to trial, thereby enhancing the possibility of 
"corroborating" their stories and testimony as to what 
they would say at the trial (T.l03-106). This goes to the 
credibility of the co-defendants and Shearer, the admitted 
robber and a twice convicted felon. 
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The mentioning of appellant's incarceartion would 
be totally harmless due to the fact that appellant was 
dressed in prison or jail clothing, thereby making it known 
to the jury that he was presently incarcerated, notwith-
standing the testimony of the jailer. Thereby, no error 
or harm resulted. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that none of the issues raised 
are of sufficient merit to support a claim of prejudice 
or to have denied appellant a fair trial on the merits. 
Judge Sawaya found no merit in appellant's allegations, 
and respondent respectfully requests this Honorable Court 
to so affirm his findings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOiv 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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